By Sergey Sukhankin

In early January 2025, operations at the uranium-producing Kazakhstan-based Joint Venture Inkai LLP (JV Inkai) were temporarily halted – the venture, established in the early 1990s, has been jointly managed by Kazatomprom (which holds a 60 percent stake) and the Canadian company Cameco (with 40 percent) – resulting in a brief decline in the share prices of both firms in New York and evident concern among Canadian investors. After a short interruption, activities at Inkai resumed without disruption. This event – though seemingly a minor occurrence that largely escaped the attention of many analysts – reflects broader and more concerning trends (particularly for the West) emerging within the global uranium market, in which Kazakhstan plays a pivotal role.

Photo source: NAC Kazatomprom JSC

BACKGROUND: The strategic significance of uranium extends well beyond its military applications. The rapidly increasing global interest in nuclear energy—among both economically advanced and developing countries—is contributing to uranium’s emergence as a commodity of critical strategic value. According to estimates by the International Energy Agency (IEA), in addition to the existing 420 nuclear reactors worldwide, 63 new reactors are currently under construction, and the operational lifespan of a further 60 reactors is being extended. As a result, uranium's importance is projected to grow steadily in the years ahead. The present and future stability of the global nuclear energy sector is therefore highly contingent upon reliable access to substantial, readily extractable uranium reserves located in politically stable and predictable nations. It is precisely in this context, however, that significant challenges begin to surface.

Following the onset of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, Western access to two critical sources of both enriched and unenriched uranium has been partially obstructed. U.S. sanctions targeting Russian uranium have jeopardized U.S. access to this supply, while geopolitical instability—marked by a pronounced anti-Western orientation—in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Niger, has effectively severed France’s access to locally sourced unenriched uranium. Exacerbating this situation, other major African uranium producers, including Namibia and Tanzania, are increasingly inclined to cooperate with Russia and China in uranium extraction activities. This emerging alignment places them in growing opposition to Western companies and their strategic interests.

At present, the already limited list of geopolitically stable, world-class uranium-producing nations has effectively narrowed to just three: Kazakhstan, Canada, and Australia. Among them, Kazakhstan stands as the global leader in the production of unenriched uranium, accounting for over 40 percent of total global output, and ranks as the second-largest country in terms of uranium reserves.

The primary concern lies in the fact that, despite its considerable wealth in natural resources, Kazakhstan is unable to fully leverage its vast resource potential. The country remains heavily dependent on two dominant geopolitical actors—Russia and China—both of which exert significant influence over the direction and development of Kazakhstan’s uranium-producing sector. Most critically, these two states maintain increasingly strained relations with the West.

Consequently, certain Kazakhstan-based analysts have voiced suspicions that the underlying cause of the operational halt at Inkai was pressure exerted by Russia, allegedly in response to Kazakhstan’s post-2022 efforts to alter the logistics of its uranium exports by decreasing reliance on Russian transit routes and instead utilizing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (commonly referred to as the Middle Corridor) as an alternative to exporting uranium through Russian territory.

IMPLICATIONS: The global uranium industry is currently characterized by rapidly increasing demand alongside growing uncertainty regarding the reliability of supply, driven largely by global and regional geopolitical disruptions. Within this context, Kazakhstan’s role as a resource-rich and historically stable supplier of uranium has acquired a qualitatively new significance. Notably, Kazakh authorities have publicly committed to boosting uranium production in 2025 and to diversifying both their export destinations and logistical routes, aiming to reduce the country's reliance on Russia. Nevertheless, the “Inkai incident”—which allegedly represents only the visible portion of deeper structural dynamics affecting Kazakhstan’s uranium sector—raises three key concerns.

First, can Kazakhstan successfully restructure its existing logistical routes and thereby reduce its strategic dependence on Russia? On the surface, such a shift appears feasible. According to statistics provided by Kazakh authorities, the country has made tangible progress in increasing uranium shipments through the Middle Corridor. Available data indicate that approximately 64 percent of West-bound uranium exports are now transported via this route. Moreover, Kazakhstan has also expanded its uranium exports to Western markets, with shipments destined for the United States gaining particular prominence.

The reality, however, appears significantly more complex. Despite recent efforts to diversify transit routes, a substantial portion of Kazakhstan’s uranium exports continues to be transported through Russian territory. Furthermore, Russia’s state-owned corporation Rosatom maintains (in)direct control over at least five of Kazakhstan’s fourteen major uranium production sites, reinforcing Russia’s strategic influence over the sector. In addition, the Middle Corridor presents notable challenges. Geopolitically, Georgia—an essential transit country along the route—occupies a critical position, and its political leadership has demonstrated increasing alignment with Moscow, potentially complicating matters should Russo-Western relations further deteriorate. From a logistical standpoint, representatives of the Canadian firm Cameco have expressed concerns, stating that the Middle Corridor “has proven to be neither reliable nor predictable,” due to the complex network of countries traversed and the numerous permits required for transit.

Compounding these challenges is the apparent ambivalence within Kazakhstan regarding the exclusion of Russia from its current uranium transportation framework. Specifically, Kazakh officials have indicated that the country does not intend to significantly expand the use of the Middle Corridor for uranium exports. Additionally, many Kazakhstan-based experts express skepticism about any prospective reduction in cooperation with Rosatom (i.e., Russia). On the contrary, a prevailing view among these analysts is that bilateral collaboration in the uranium sector is likely to deepen in the future.

Second, what is the actual role of China in Kazakhstan’s uranium industry and how will this role evolve? At present, China is the world’s second-largest consumer of uranium, following the United States, and its demand is expected to continue rising. Kazakhstan serves as China’s primary source of uranium: according to several studies, over half of Kazakhstan’s uranium output is currently exported to China, with some estimates suggesting this figure may be as high as 60 percent. This situation, as noted by representatives of major Western uranium-related enterprises, “raises concerns about reduced availability for Western markets, potentially exacerbating global supply constraints,” a challenge that is already beginning to manifest within the industry.

Rosatom-affiliated Uranium One Group recently concluded an agreement with the Chinese firm SNURDC Astana Mining Company Limited, a subsidiary of the State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Co., Ltd. Under this arrangement, the Russian side transferred its shares in uranium-producing sites located in Northern Kazakhstan (Northern Khorasan) to its Chinese counterparts. At present, there is no consensus among experts regarding China’s rationale for acquiring stakes in what is considered a relatively depleted and comparatively minor uranium production site.
While some analysts contend that the acquisition primarily serves China’s geoeconomic objectives—particularly in light of projections indicating a substantial increase in the country’s uranium consumption over the coming years—others emphasize a more overtly geopolitical dimension to China’s actions. Notably, Stanislav Pritchin of the Central Asia Department at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences has drawn attention to China’s established practice of acquiring “unpromising” oil and natural gas deposits. In his view, such acquisitions function as instruments for expanding China’s strategic presence within the host country.

Third, what is the future role of Western companies in Kazakhstan’s uranium industry? Given that neither China nor Russia appears willing to reduce their involvement in the sector—thereby sustaining Kazakhstan’s strategic dependency on both actors—serious concerns have emerged regarding the potential marginalization or even eventual withdrawal of Western firms from the country’s uranium landscape. Indeed, some Kazakhstan-based experts have implicitly acknowledged a widely discussed notion circulating in Western policy and business circles: the ongoing bifurcation of the global uranium industry. This refers to the emergence of a distinct segmentation of uranium supply chains along geopolitical lines, with one stream aligned with the West and the other with the China-led bloc. Within this context, it is feared that Kazakhstan may ultimately be compelled to align more closely with the latter and reduce its cooperation with Western partners accordingly.

Undoubtedly, such a scenario would only be likely to materialize in the event of a further deterioration in political and economic relations between China (and, under certain conditions, Russia) and their Western counterparts. While this scenario remains hypothetical at present, it is by no means implausible.

CONCLUSION: Although Kazakhstan and its political leadership have expressed strong interest in expanding foreign—particularly Western—participation in the country’s uranium industry, the influence of external geopolitical dynamics cannot be overlooked. As uranium increasingly assumes a role in the global energy mix comparable to that historically occupied by fossil fuels, the issue of access to and supply of this resource has transcended purely economic considerations and has firmly entered the realm of geopolitics.

In light of the intensifying geopolitical competition between East and West over access to emerging markets and spheres of influence, it is conceivable that China and its strategic partners may seek to curtail Western access to Kazakhstan-based uranium—mirroring developments in Sub-Saharan Africa, where Western firms are increasingly being displaced from uranium-related ventures. To avert a potential supply shock—akin to that experienced in the oil and natural gas sector following Russia’s attempt, in the aftermath of February 2022, to weaponize hydrocarbon exports as a means of exerting geopolitical pressure on the West—it is imperative that Western companies (and, arguably, governments) begin to explore alternative uranium sources to sustain their nuclear energy agendas. Given the small number of globally significant suppliers, increased attention should be directed toward Canada and Australia, which possess substantial uranium reserves and are regarded as geopolitically stable and reliable partners.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).     

S. Frederick Starr

April 3, 2025

This article is an English version of an article to appear in Uzbek in Vatan (Motherland), Uzbekistan's leading journal.

Read Uzbekistan and the Institutionalization of Greater Central Asia PDF

S. Frederick Starr

March 20, 2025

This article was originally delivered as a speech in March 2025 at an Asian Development Bank conference on connectivity and trade under their Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program. 

Read Coordinating the Corridors (PDF)

Nargiza Umarova

March 12, 2025

In the current geopolitical realities, Central Asia seeks to restore its historical role as a land-based transportation and logistics hub, facilitating connections between East and West, as well as North and South. Most of the region’s countries promote their own projects including railways, gas pipelines, and power lines through Afghanistan, which offer them substantial economic and geopolitical advantages. However, the intervention of major powers, including Russia, China, India, and Iran, could create a serious conflict of interest on the trans-Afghan track. To mitigate risks, Central Asian states should implement a coordinated policy for developing the southern transit direction on a mutually beneficial basis.

Read What the Extension of Transport Corridors in Afghanistan Means for Central Asia (PDF) 

By Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi

On February 22, 2025, during a meeting with Uzbekistan'ss Prime Minister Abdullah Aripov, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Akhund, representing the Taliban, called for Uzbek investment in repairing crucial infrastructure, including the Mazar-e-Sharif–Herat railway and the second Salang tunnel. These projects are seen as vital for improving communication and trade between Central and South Asia. Baradar reaffirmed the Taliban's commitment to regional stability and enhancing economic relations, while Uzbekistan expressed support for deepening cooperation and advancing joint initiatives. The Taliban's diplomacy in Central Asia is increasingly focused on economic cooperation, prioritizing infrastructure development and trade expansion.

BACKGROUND: Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) entered Afghanistan, and Central Asian countries aligned with the US by providing military support, road access, and airspace. Initially, these countries opposed the Taliban, backing anti-Taliban movements. However, over time, as the Taliban adapted their strategy and reduced their overt support for Central Asian militant groups, some regional countries shifted to a more neutral stance on Afghanistan.

During the Doha peace process, delegates from Central Asian countries held several meetings with the Taliban negotiating team, laying the groundwork for post-U.S. withdrawal relations. When American forces withdrew in August 2021, the Taliban regained control, creating security concerns for neighboring Central Asian states. This shift in power forced regional actors to reassess their approach, balancing security risks with economic and geopolitical interests.

Despite these concerns, most of Central Asian countries kept their embassies open in Kabul and initiated political and economic engagement with the Taliban. For its part, the Taliban, facing a financial crisis due to sanctions, frozen assets, reduced foreign aid, a water crisis, and a lack of international recognition, pursued an economic-oriented foreign policy. This included announcing expanding transportation infrastructure, such as the Mazar-e-Sharif-Herat-Kandahar railway corridor (1,468 km), approved in May 2023, and the Spin Boldak-Kandahar railway, set to connect Central Asia to South Asia in 2024.

IMPLICATIONS: The Taliban’s return to power has significantly reshaped regional geopolitics and economic ties. With the US withdrawal creating a power vacuum, regional actors have sought to strengthen their positions. The Taliban, in turn, have sought new partnerships to break their political and economic isolation.

As Central Asian nations engage with the Taliban while remaining wary of potential instability, they have also strengthened ties with other powers like China and Russia. This shifting landscape raises critical questions about Afghanistan's evolving role in the region, particularly in terms of security cooperation, counterterrorism efforts, and border management.

Uzbekistan was the first Central Asian country to host a Taliban delegation, receiving Acting Deputy Prime Minister Mawlawi Abdul Salam Hanafi in Termez in September 2021. Both sides signed a security and trade protocol, exchanged diplomats, and expanded economic relations. On April 13, 2023, Uzbekistan hosted the 4th meeting of Afghanistan’s neighboring foreign ministers in Samarkand to discuss the Afghan situation.

As the Russia-Ukraine war disrupts trade, Uzbekistan—where three of its eight transit corridors depend on Russia—has accelerated efforts to find alternative routes. In August 2024, the Uzbek Prime Minister visited Kabul to discuss trade and investment projects, resulting in 35 MoUs worth $2.5 billion. Trade between the two countries reached $860 million. Additionally, Uzbekistan has played a key role in infrastructure development, co-signing a trilateral agreement with Afghanistan and Pakistan in July 2023 for the Trans-Afghan Railway, linking Mazar-e-Sharif to Pakistan’s ports, with a projected cost of $6 billion.

In February 2025, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar led a high-ranking Taliban delegation to Uzbekistan to deepen economic, trade, and transport cooperation. Tashkent also committed to completing the "Khalqlaar Bazar" border market and providing Afghan citizens with a 15-day visa-free regime.

As for Kazakhstan, Afghanistan's top wheat, flour, and edible oil supplier, it maintained its embassy in Kabul after the Taliban’s takeover. Both sides exchanged ambassadors, strengthening diplomatic ties. Since 2023, three business forums in Astana, Almaty, and Kabul have facilitated agreements worth $1.5 billion. In April 2024, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister led a delegation to Kabul for an Afghanistan-Kazakhstan business forum, exploring investment in the chemical, mining, and metallurgical industries. Bilateral trade grew to $700 million in 9 months of  2024, a 14% increase from 2023, with projections reaching $3 billion in five years.

Kazakhstan also joined Turkmenistan’s initiative to build a logistics hub in Herat and expressed interest in the Trans-Afghan Railway, initially agreed upon by the Taliban, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan in 2021, to access South Asian and Gulf markets.

Historically neutral, Turkmenistan has maintained close ties with the Taliban since the 1990s. It remains a major oil and gas supplier to Afghanistan, with trade valued at over $500 million. Turkmen investments in Afghanistan exceed $1.5 billion, including infrastructure projects such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. In 2024, top Taliban officials met Turkmen leaders to resume work on TAPI, sign MoUs worth $200 million, and explore oil and gas transit routes linking Russia to South Asia via Afghanistan. Additionally, the two sides signed a $7 million agreement for three railway projects in September 2024.

With a 1,360 km border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan was initially the most vocal opponent of the Taliban, demanding an inclusive government with ethnic and gender representation. Anti-Taliban figures gathered in Tajikistan, drawing criticism from Kabul. However, economic cooperation persisted, with Tajikistan continuing electricity exports and opening five joint border markets in September 2023. The Jalaluddin Mohammad Balkhi-Sher Khan Port railway project, first signed in 2019, resumed, enhancing connectivity with Central Asia. Trade between Afghanistan and Tajikistan reached $120 million in 2024. A recent unofficial meeting between top Tajik security officials and the Taliban signaled a thaw in relations.

Concerned about the rights of the Afghan Kyrgyz minority in the Pamir region, Kyrgyzstan established early contacts with the Taliban. In September 2021, Deputy Chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council Taalatbek Masadykov met with the Taliban Foreign Minister. Trade and transit discussions continued, with Kyrgyzstan serving as a transit route for Afghan goods to China and playing a key role in the CASA-1000 electricity transmission project.

In September 2024, Kyrgyzstan’s Cabinet Chairman Akylbek Japarov met with Taliban representatives, expressing interest in expanding trade, transportation, energy, and agriculture cooperation. Some Afghan Kyrgyz, facing economic hardship and limited educational opportunities, have requested relocation to Kyrgyzstan. In response, the Taliban recently established the “Pamir” district for the Kyrgyz ethnic minority.

CONCLUSIONS: To better understand the Taliban’s role in Central Asia, it’s crucial to examine their balancing act between China and Russia, two regional powers with different interests. While China seeks stability in Afghanistan to secure trade routes under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and prevent extremism near Xinjiang, Russia focuses on managing the security risks spilling over into its Central Asian sphere. The Taliban, in turn, is strategically leveraging its position as a buffer state, engaging both countries diplomatically while positioning itself as a key player in regional security.

Since retaking power, the Taliban have pursued economic diplomacy, reassuring Central Asian neighbors of border security and promoting trade expansion. This shift has redirected Afghanistan’s trade partnerships from Pakistan toward Central Asia and Russia. The Taliban have leveraged Afghanistan’s geographic position to sign infrastructure MoUs, including railways and transit corridors, inviting regional investment in large-scale projects.

Central Asian states are balancing their engagement with Afghanistan while securing their interests. However, ongoing security risks, potential shifts in Taliban leadership, and external geopolitical pressures could alter the region’s engagement strategy. Future developments, such as increased intelligence cooperation or shifts in global economic alignments, may further impact Afghanistan’s regional role.

AUTHORS’ BIO: Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a journalist and researcher focusing on Central Asia. She writes about press freedom, human rights, and politics in the former Soviet space, and delves into China’s interests in the region for publications like The Diplomat, The Guardian, Reuters, and Eurasianet. Dr. Fayazuddin Ghiasi is a Rumsfeld Fellow and senior Researcher on Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Centre for Afghanistan and Regional Studies. He writes about regional geo-economics and geo-strategy, connectivity and politics in various national and international news outlets and journals.